

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.259
26 April 1966
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH MEETING

Hold at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 26 April 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

(CANADA)

OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS
Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. V. CEBIS

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEJERE
Mr. O. O. ADTSOLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. S. A. BOGOMOLOV
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. A. SALAM
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON
Mr. M. J. F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. S. DePALMA
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD
Mr. I. B. RICHARDS

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. P. P. SPINELLI

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the two hundred and fifty-ninth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): At the end of the recent talks in Rome between the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko, and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fanfani, a communiqué was issued, a large part of which was devoted to disarmament problems. In regard to the specific question on the agenda of the present meeting, the communiqué reaffirms the conviction that general and complete disarmament is the most effective means of ensuring peace --- a conviction which is certainly shared by all delegations here present. It is with this conviction, once more proclaimed in the Rome communiqué, that my delegation intervenes again in this debate on general and complete disarmament.

The Rome joint communiqué affirms, moreover, the need to render the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee more fruitful; this, too, I believe, will certainly meet with the general approval of the Committee. Within this context and with this aim my delegation proposes this morning to make, if possible, a further and very modest contribution to the solution of the problems before us. This solution cannot be made easier by sterile polemics or baseless accusations. It can be found only by tackling the objective difficulties with determination and goodwill on both sides, and by ensuring that our work becomes more concrete and constructive, in accordance with the hope expressed in the Rome joint communiqué.

With that premise as its starting-point my delegation, while refusing to engage in polemics on the remarks made last Thursday, wonders whether in our work on general and complete disarmament we have not neglected certain methods or procedures which might produce more satisfactory results. That is the particular problem to which I should like to draw the attention of the Conference.

We know --- and everyone agrees on this point --- that general and complete disarmament is based on three pillars: the maintenance of the balance of military forces during the disarmament process, the establishment of appropriate international control, and the progressive organization of collective security. So far, the work of the Conference has been mainly --- indeed I would say almost solely --- concentrated on the first two pillars or elements: balance and control. During our study of these

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

two objectives our efforts have hitherto encountered serious problems which we have been unable to solve. I myself am beginning to think that perhaps the reason why all these difficulties and problems appear to be more serious and insurmountable is that we have neglected to study the third element or pillar of general and complete disarmament: the organization of a peaceful world without weapons and equipped with international peace-keeping forces.

It is the lack of a clear view of this type of problem that has made our study and our agreement on questions of balance and control more difficult. If we do not know what collective system of guarantees would be established as armaments were reduced, if no agreement in principle exists on the final structure of this system, the complexity and the difficulties of the process of the controlled reduction and elimination of armaments will be increased and aggravated. Fundamentally, the main difficulties in our negotiations on balance and control derive from a single problem -- that of confidence. If this confidence -- bilateral, so to say -- is insufficient or uncertain, we must envisage, in order to facilitate agreements, the intervention of another type of confidence, a supplementary and integrative confidence -- confidence in the functioning of an appropriate collective security organization.

Thus the shortcomings, weaknesses and even dangers inherent in certain disarmament agreements, either because of an imperfect balance or because of the impossibility of complete control, would be offset or mitigated by the possibility of recourse to a supreme international authority guaranteeing security and endowed with sufficient means of execution for the maintenance of peace.

The organization of this supreme authority and its inherent problems have not been studied in sufficient depth by this Committee. In this respect both sides have confined themselves to making somewhat sketchy proposals and explaining -- without going into too much detail or seeking to reconcile them -- the provisions contained in the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The Soviet Draft treaty's provisions (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) appear to be quite ineffective and somewhat contradictory. It was conceived at a time when the "troïka" concept was in fashion. That concept now seems to be outdated -- at least I hope so -- but the Soviet delegation has not put forward any new proposal based on different and more effective concepts.

The United States draft treaty (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2 and 3) contains wider and more realistic provisions, but perhaps they too would require further elucidation and elaboration. The idea of taking up again the concept of collective security, and particularly the problem of international peace-keeping forces, to facilitate our work on disarmament is not new. That idea had already been put forward by the Swedish delegation at our meeting of 28 July 1964. Indeed, Mrs. Myrdal emphasized the need to outline a plan for international security forces. She stressed that, in order to be able to judge the merits of disarmament proposals,

"... we must have a clearer view of the compensating increase in international security arrangements" (ENDC/PV.202, p.13), and added:

"... the new security must ultimately rely on a more solid foundation of confidence, to be engendered pari passu with the disarmament process." (ibid.).

Mrs. Myrdal even put forward the specific suggestion that a thorough study be made of the proposals concerning the international peace-keeping force contained in the two draft treaties for the three stages of disarmament. She then said:

"I might even suggest that also on that item we start from the far end -- from how we want that force to be shaped when it assumes the ultimate responsibility for world peace -- and thereafter outline the course we should have to take in order to reach that goal from where we now stand." (ibid.)

At first sight it might seem utopian to embark on the study of a very complex and intricate matter which would be only the end of an obviously very long process. However, I believe that, if we look at the question more closely, such a study will not appear to be altogether useless. The difficulty of elaborating a system of collective security in a world without weapons lies not only in the very complexity of the problems inherent in the system, but also in putting the system into operation and applying it progressively.

(Mr. Cavallotti, Italy)

As Mrs. Myrdal rightly pointed out (ibid., pp. 13, 14), the measures required by the arrangements for organizing collective security will have to be developed in step with the progressive elimination of armaments. The synchronization of the two processes -- the elimination of armaments and the organization of collective security -- is particularly difficult; but it becomes still more difficult when only the end of one of these processes, the total reduction of armaments, is known and the end of the other process, the organization of a peaceful world, is unknown. If we could devise by common agreement the scheme of the final stage of that organization, we should perhaps find it less difficult to envisage the portions, so to speak, of that scheme which could be applied during the earlier stages.

For any study of this type it would, of course, be necessary to start from the present situation and see where, how, and by what means the United Nations could be reinforced and adapted to the new situation, that of a world completely without arms, bearing in mind that the final system must provide complete security for all, even and especially for the smaller countries, by protecting them from any threat, blackmail and subversion.

At any rate, even if it is desired that the Committee should confine its attention to the requirements of collective security in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, I think that this matter deserves immediate study; for, as I have just said, there would be fewer misgivings about embarking on a process of armaments reduction if it were known that peace-keeping machinery, partial at the outset and then progressively developed, would be guaranteed.

That, of course, entails long and arduous work, whether the first or the second method is adopted. We have often spoken here of working groups and special committees, but unfortunately to no avail. The Eastern delegations have always rejected, on one pretext or another, any proposals for meetings of specialists and technical experts. In regard to the problem I am discussing now the situation is quite different: a committee of experts would not be necessary. The Conference would only need to pay particular attention to a given problem by devoting a few meetings to it exclusively. All agree that the problem exists, must be solved and is closely connected with disarmament. I hope everyone will also agree that it would be useful for method and system to study it thoroughly without delay, side by side with the problem of reduction of armaments.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Such work would in no way hamper the elaboration of other disarmament measures; it might even facilitate and expedite this. Moreover, a decision by the Conference to set to work in the field I have indicated would be a very valuable psychological stimulus, emphasize the importance of the Committee's task, raise hope everywhere, and open encouraging prospects.

Last Thursday the representative of the Soviet Union made some remarks (ENDC/PV.258. pp. 9, 10) concerning my previous statement on collateral measures (ENDC/PV.257. pp. 21 et seq.). I have of course studied his statement and reserve the right to reply to it more fully when collateral measures are again on the agenda. Meanwhile, I wish to thank Mr. Roshchin here and now for the attention he gave to my arguments, even if he felt unable to reply to the fundamental question I asked. It was this: does the Soviet delegation believe, as we believe, that disarmament must begin by halting the production of armaments? Does the Soviet delegation envisage the halting of this production in certain specified sectors? However, we shall undoubtedly have an opportunity to resume this debate later and I hope that the Soviet delegation will then be good enough to give us some clarifications on this point.

The importance of collateral measures was also mentioned in the Rome joint communiqué, and this undoubtedly conforms with the wishes of the delegations here present. That is why I hope that fruitful work and discussions on that subject can be undertaken again in this Conference.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): (translation from French) I shall not speak about general and complete disarmament, because I intend to devote my statement today to several problems which you yourself, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of Canada, raised in the speech you made at the meeting on 21 April (ENDC/PV.258).

First of all I want to thank you for the attention which you so kindly gave to my statement of 19 April (ENDC/PV.257). It seems to me that the argument which you started with me proves that the problems I raised cannot simply be evaded. It is true that we have not yet found solutions to which all can subscribe; but nothing can change the essential fact that our common task is to seek such solutions and that it is the duty of us all to find them.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

After those few preliminary remarks, I should like to deal with the substance of the matter. Referring to my speech, you were good enough, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of Canada, in examining some of the proposals put forward by the socialist countries, to say:

"I do not think there is any responsible national government that does not want to see the end of the cold war; but the 'cold' of this war, like the cold of the Central European winter, is going to disappear gradually -- not in a flash". (ENDC/PV.258, p.17).

You are of the opinion that the measures proposed by the United States serve precisely this purpose, whereas the measures proposed by the socialist countries either do not come within the competence of the Committee -- as, for instance, the non-aggression pact (ENDC/77) -- or do not conform to the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), in particular Principle No.5.

You will recall that the interpretation of this principle was one of the favourite subjects of our earlier debates. It even seemed to me that the delegation of Canada shared to a large extent our attitude towards it. At least, Mr. Chairman, that is how I understood the very interesting formula concerning the concept of balance which you set forth in the statement you made during our meeting of 3 February:

"... the principle that is generally referred to as the 'principle of balance'.

"In passing, I should like to remark that this so-called principle of balance, one of those contained in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations ... is not -- and I repeat: not -- the same thing as the balance of power, which is a political conception of the past, under which alliances between nations were contracted with the intention of offsetting a supposed military superiority of some particular nation which it was thought might otherwise set up a hegemony in Europe." (ENDC/PV.237, p.23).

I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that the political concept based on the balance of power is bankrupt; but I believe that so also is the concept of the cold war. If this is so, we must break the ice of the cold war, which is blocking the way to a détente, with icebreakers and not wait until it melts by itself -- which I very much doubt it will do -- as a result of the execution of the United States proposals on collateral measures.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

In one of your previous statements, speaking as the representative of Canada, you endeavoured to convince us that even the destruction of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles would not eliminate the danger of nuclear war so long as the great Powers retained 70 per cent of their conventional armed forces and facilities for the production of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.249, p.8). If you are really convinced of the correctness of this thesis you should, in my opinion, have all the more doubt about the effectiveness of the United States proposals. In fact, in the present situation marked by the existence of huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of fissile materials for their production, what importance can there be in halting the production of these materials or in destroying a thousand atomic bombs?

One can agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that the balance of power is a political conception of the past; but unfortunately the deeds of the Western Powers do not accord with this observation. We do not have to look far for proof. The events in Viet-Nam and in other regions of the world provide striking demonstration of the use of force, which remains the essential instrument of United States policy. In this connexion I cannot refrain from quoting the phrase used by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, a newspaper which certainly cannot be suspected of having anti-American opinions. In its issue of 21 April this newspaper states: "With every American soldier who leaves Europe the political influence of the United States on European polities diminishes". That is the fundamental difficulty preventing any progress either towards general and complete disarmament or in collateral measures.

The Polish delegation considers that the conception of the policy of strength should be replaced by the conception based on the principle of peaceful co-existence and of balance of security. Strategy must be subordinated to this conception. Only thus can a real prospect be opened for the implementation of collateral measures and general and complete disarmament.

We have emphasized on many occasions the great political -- and not only political -- importance of a non-aggression pact between the States belonging to NATO and the States signatories of the Warsaw Pact. The objection that the Committee has no competence, which you as the representative of Canada have mentioned, does not stand up to a critical examination. Moreover, I am convinced that you, Mr. Chairman, are very well aware that the difficulties standing in the way of the conclusion of a

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non-aggression pact do not concern procedure. But if some other body with a different composition would suit the delegation of Canada better, the Polish delegation is ready to consider any proposal on this subject.

Nor is the reference to the provisions of the United Nations Charter better founded. The United Nations Charter is merely a statement of general principles. Modern international law is developed by applying the United Nations Charter in concrete cases; and that is the aim of the proposed non-aggression pact.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, you considered that the defensive character of NATO makes the non-aggression pact meaningless. I do not intend to join issue here over the aims and tasks of NATO; on this subject we have our opinion, which is known to everyone. I should merely like to point out that, if the declared peaceful intentions were an obstacle preventing countries from concluding non-aggression pacts, probably none would ever have been concluded.

You yourself, Mr. Chairman, as the representative of Canada, apparently believe that a system of European security and a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the signatories of the Warsaw Treaty are useless and can be replaced by an exchange of declarations of peaceful intentions within an arbitrarily chosen group of States.

I think you will certainly have noted that the proposal for an exchange of declarations to which you have referred contains a fundamental gap. Indeed, there has been omitted the exchange of declarations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State which is the object of the most virulent attacks by the Federal Republic of Germany, namely, the German Democratic Republic. What, in fact, can be the value of these declarations if they do not include the German Democratic Republic, a State signatory of the Warsaw Pact, which provides, as we know, for collective action by all its members in the event of an act of aggression directed against one of them?

I should now like to devote a few words to the position which you, Mr. Chairman, as the representative of Canada, have taken in regard to the proposal for a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (A/RES/1653(XVI)).

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

I think that the difference between the positions taken in this respect by the socialist States and the Western States lies in the very conception of the role of the atomic weapon. The fundamental problem that arises is whether the atomic weapon is a weapon like any other. The answer can only be in the negative. This finding has practical consequences, first of all in the law of nations. In fact, since humanity began to seek to alleviate the sufferings of war a distinction has always been made between different types of weapons. Article 22 of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 stated clearly: "The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited".

The same idea appeared in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which prohibited the use of certain projectiles which were either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances. The Hague Convention of 1899 dealt with bullets "which expand or flatten". Poisoned weapons were expressly prohibited by Article 23(a) of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Need I quote, further, the prohibition in 1899 of the use of projectiles for the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases, and the 1925 Protocol extending this prohibition to methods of warfare using similar materials or liquids, or bacteriological weapons?

What was the principle behind all these instruments? It was to distinguish certain types of weapons which were more harmful, more dangerous, more destructive and capable of causing unnecessary harm. These instruments mark a certain trend or progress towards the prohibition of weapons causing unnecessary harm or injuries to human beings. The weapon and its reprehensible character constituted the decisive element.

The opposition of the Western Powers to the proposal for the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of atomic weapons amounts to a repudiation of all this heritage which now forms an integral part of international law. Are we going to agree with those who would like us not only to accustom ourselves to living with the atom bomb, with this sword of Damocles hanging over our heads, but also to accept the idea of its inevitable use? With that question I shall end my remarks.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): Today, as we continue our search for a common basis for progress toward an agreement on general and complete disarmament, we are again reminded of the magnitude of this task. We are trying to reverse a build-up of arms which has been going on for decades and in which nuclear weapons are one of the key elements. This will require radical alterations in national defence strategies, and the recasting of military forces. It will require the installation of an acceptable and dependable control system and, as Mr. Cavallletti has reminded us this morning in his eloquent statement, it will also require the strengthening of peace-keeping forces and other international institutions to guarantee the security of all nations, large and small.

We should keep these considerations in mind as we seek the elimination of nuclear war, which I am sure we all agree is the most urgent goal of this Committee. On 15 March of this year the Soviet representative stressed "nuclear disarmament" as "the crux of the problem of general and complete disarmament" (ENDC/PV.248, p.13). The record shows that the United States has pursued this aim persistently since the time it was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons and represented the Baruch Plan, the first proposal for the control of atomic energy (AEC/PV.1).

Since 1962 efforts to control nuclear weapons have been a primary concern of this Committee. Unfortunately, we have made little progress. One of the reasons has been the refusal by the Soviet Union to consider any approach but its own to the question of reducing nuclear delivery vehicles. Further, it has refused even to explain this approach, the so-called "nuclear umbrella" proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). Instead, the Soviet Union has insisted that the Committee accept the "umbrella" proposal in principle before a working group could be established to study practical questions and details. This is hardly an indication of readiness -- and I use the Soviet representative's own words of 15 March --

"... to agree to any realistic approach to the order of further work on co-ordinating a programme of general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.248, p. 25)

There are two specific issues impeding progress on nuclear disarmament: the degree and the nature of first-stage reductions of nuclear delivery vehicles, and the inspection process which must accompany any reduction programme if the security interests of all are to be protected. At the same meeting, on 15 March, the Soviet representative again proposed that we organize our debates on general and complete disarmament around the proposal of the "nuclear umbrella". On 22 March the

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representative of Czechoslovakia characterized the elimination of nuclear weapons in the first stage, or of nuclear weapons and their delivery means simultaneously, as "the only correct path, the path which leads to real disarmament". (ENDC/PV.250, p.35)

The United States does not object to radical disarmament measures. After all, the United States has proposed a treaty which would ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles from national arsenals. The concept of general and complete disarmament is inherently a radical one, judged against the course of all human history and traditional views of national sovereignty. The willingness to consider, and to take, radical steps is indeed essential to the accomplishment of our task.

We do object, however, to radical measures when they are not sound or practical. We object to drastic action in the first stage of disarmament if it could endanger our security. And we do object to being told that there is an "only way", and that our way is not worth considering. Apocalyptic concepts of a world freed at a stroke from all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles may have a certain visionary appeal, but they are wholly impractical at this moment in time.

As an example, we heard the representative of the Soviet Union state at our meeting on 21 April, that the Soviet proposal --

"... provides for the implementation in the first stage of disarmament of such radical measures as the destruction of all" -- I repeat, all -- "nuclear weapon delivery vehicles..." (ENDC/PV.258, p.6).

He went on to say that --

"The Soviet Union is also ready to destroy nuclear weapons in the first stage, if our partners in the negotiations will agree to this." (ibid, p.7).

Let us recall the long-standing Soviet refusal to permit any inspection for unauthorized armaments until the process of disarmament is completed. What would happen to those nations which fulfilled their commitment to destroy nuclear weapons if some other nation were to evade its obligations? In a world largely disarmed of nuclear weapons, even a very few illegally-retained weapons would become highly significant. Yet, in describing the Soviet approach to disarmament, the Soviet representative said at the meeting on 15 March:

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"... the essence of our proposal is in practice to exclude, from the very first stage of general and complete disarmament, any possibility of a course of events in which a State might be able, by halting the disarmament process of its own will, to achieve a strategically-advantageous position in relation to other States." (ENDC/PV.248, p.19)

Let me review again what would happen under the two versions of an agreement on general and complete disarmament if either the United States or the Soviet Union were unilaterally to hold up the process of disarmament at the end of stage I. What nation, if any, would gain a strategic advantage in each case?

Under the United States draft (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add. 1, 2 and 3), all armaments on each side would be reduced by 30 per cent during the first stage. At the end of the stage, therefore, there would be proportionately less in each category than at the beginning of the disarmament process. There would be no change in relative strengths, so that neither side could gain an advantage by stopping the disarmament process.

Under the amended Soviet draft (ENDC/2/Rev.1), all but a small number of nuclear missiles on the territories of the United States and the Soviet Union would have been destroyed by the end of the first stage. I assume there has been no further amendment of the Soviet treaty despite the statement by the Soviet representative at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.258, pp. 13, 14). All foreign bases would have been dismantled, and all troops withdrawn to national territories. Conventional armaments would have been reduced by 30 per cent. Under this situation, abrogation of the agreement by the Soviet Union would give it an immediate strategic advantage over less powerful neighbours whose security is in some cases now strengthened by the presence of United States military forces.

How can the Soviet Union say, as the Soviet representative did on 15 March, that the Soviet plan ensures that --

"Throughout the process of disarmament the security of all States -- and I stress this point -- would be equally safeguarded." (ENDC/PV.248, p.18)?

The Soviet plan seems to be designed rather to ensure that such stability and security as the world now enjoys as a result of the existing balance would be sacrificed in order to improve the position of certain powerful States vis-à-vis their smaller neighbours.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

That brings me to the second issue which impedes progress on nuclear disarmament: that is, the provision -- or lack of it -- for adequate verification. The attitude of the communist nations toward verification reveals a basic dichotomy in their thinking about disarmament. On the one hand, when they are talking about reductions, they insist that radical steps are imperative. On the other, when it comes to arrangements to ensure that the purpose of disarmament is not evaded by concealment or new production of armaments, they refuse to consider even minimum steps. They appear to be capable of an enormous act of faith in their willingness to trust us not to evade an agreement; but this appearance of faith dissolves when they discuss the uses which they allege the West might make of minimum verification arrangements.

The stated Soviet approach to verification is that there should be "control over disarmament, not over armaments." Now if this were interpreted, as it could be, to mean that controls should be established for the purpose of ensuring that parties to a disarmament agreement actually reduce their arms to a certain level, or even that they do not increase their arms above a certain level, then the United States could agree. We have even proposed measures, such as the destruction of nuclear weapons in connexion with a cut-off of production of fissionable materials (ENDC/165), and the B-47/Tu-16 bomber bonfire (ENDC/PV.176) under which verification would simply ensure that armaments were reduced by agreed amounts.

But the Soviet Union insists on interpreting "control over disarmament" as involving only the certification of destruction of armaments -- that is, until the process of disarmament is completed. It does make one exception: in the case of the "nuclear umbrella" proposal it would permit legally-retained missiles to be verified by control posts at the launching pads. But what about weapons illegally retained or produced?

Does anybody really believe that during most of the disarmament process we shall be concerned only with weapons that have already been destroyed and those declared as legally retained? Of course not. In the absence of adequate assurance against evasion, the farther we go down the road towards complete disarmament the more concerned we shall be with the possibility of clandestine armaments which can threaten our security. During the process of general and complete disarmament our confidence

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in the process, and our confidence that our security is not being jeopardized, must rest in large part on firm assurance that other participants are not maintaining forces larger than the agreement calls for.

Clearly the Soviet approach to disarmament is not the only way. Statements by the Soviet Union and its allies that "it is clear" or "it has been shown" that the Soviet plan would provide equal security for all, and that inspection is not necessary, are mere unsupported assertions. It is not clear because it has not been shown. I suggest that, as long as our efforts continue to be frustrated by a refusal on the part of the Soviet Union to take even the most limited verified steps towards actual arms limitations, we cannot reasonably expect agreement on those radical changes in existing national security arrangements which the Soviet Union proposes as a first stage of general and complete disarmament.

The reductions proposed by the United States in each stage of general and complete disarmament are not such as to jeopardize the security of any participant. However, they are extremely significant. By the end of the second stage, two-thirds of the present nuclear delivery vehicles in the United States and the Soviet Union would have been eliminated, and further production of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles would have been stopped long since.

It is missing the point to say, as the representative of the Soviet Union continues to say, that after six years, at the end of the second stage under the United States plan, there would still be enough nuclear delivery vehicles left to start a nuclear war. How many will be there six years from now, I wonder, if we do not agree on measures to stop the arms competition and if nuclear capabilities continue to expand? The important thing is that by the end of the second stage under the United States plan we shall not only have stopped the production of armaments and greatly reduced current armaments inventories, but shall have in operation an effective and equitable disarmament process. We shall have developed confidence in that process and in the participants; otherwise we should never have arrived at that stage.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The United States approach to general and complete disarmament is sound. It is more reasonable and more realistic than the Soviet plan. Nevertheless, as we have indicated time and again, we are willing to discuss the Soviet approach to the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, along with such other plans as may be presented. But we are not willing to "buy a pig in a poke" and to accept "in principle" a Soviet plan which has never even been fully explained.

Again at our meeting on 15 March, the Soviet representative remarked that the United States, in its intervention that day, had begun to speak on the problem of general and complete disarmament and had then turned to collateral measures (ENDC/PV.248, p. 23). I think he understood very well why the United States representative had related the two problems. I had assumed that it was generally agreed that we cannot wait until the world changes completely, until international tensions are replaced by amity and co-operation, before we undertake any disarmament. On the contrary, I am sure we all agree that in the world as it is we must take account of existing tensions and fears and that the process of general and complete disarmament can start -- and must start -- with what is reasonable and possible.

We must start with measures which will not prejudice existing national security arrangements while we build confidence in the process of disarmament and in one another. But even on these measures there must be firm assurance from the beginning of full compliance by all participants. Indeed, these measures are so important that it is perhaps unfortunate to label them as "collateral". If but half of them were implemented, there would be a profound change in the relations among nations and the prospect for a lasting peace would be greatly enhanced.

In fact, many of these collateral measures are also found as important elements of stage I of the United States outline of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, as well as in stage I of the Soviet plan. We have made considerable progress on some of them. For example, the limited test-ban Treaty of 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1) represents progress in carrying out stage I, section C of the United States outline, and article 17 of the Soviet draft treaty. These clauses call for agreement to prohibit nuclear weapon tests. Another example is found in section D of the United States proposed stage I and article 14 of the Soviet draft treaty. These provide that parties should agree not to place in orbit weapons of mass destruction. Progress in this area has been made through General Assembly resolution 1884 (XVIII) of October 1963.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The proposal for a freeze on the production of nuclear delivery vehicles would initiate the process foreseen in section A 3 of the United States draft outline. The proposal to cut off the production of fissionable materials and to transfer large amounts of fissionable material to peaceful purposes is paralleled in section C of the United States stage I. Finally, the non-proliferation undertakings for which we are all striving are called for in stage I of both the United States and the Soviet disarmament plans.

We must recognize the fallacy and the futility of aspiring to distant goals and then refusing to put our feet on the path to get there. We exist in time and in space. We cannot in an instant of time transport ourselves from where we are to some other distantly-removed point. We must cover the distance a step at a time.

Two paths have been charted for achieving our goal. The Soviet and the United States plans differ markedly in important respects, as I have indicated. But fortunately we are not that far apart in our approaches. The Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) continues to provide an agreed test for assessing our respective approaches. What is needed now is that combination of boldness and practicality which alone can help us to overcome the immense obstacles in our way -- boldness because, as our Soviet colleagues rightly say, general disarmament is a radical goal. It will never be achieved by timidity. But when they call for a radical reorientation of thinking, I hope that they will reconsider their own timid -- I might almost say fearful -- approach to such key issues as verification and peace-keeping. I hope that they will reconsider their refusal to face up to the need to work out the technical basis for those measures which are urgently needed now and are possible now.

We must also be practical. We must bring ourselves to examine scientific evidence and undertake technical studies. Many of the measures that we wish to see adopted are as complex as they are vital to world peace and security. That is why I hope the United States will not again be charged with contributing to a "dialogue of the deaf" because we take the trouble to apply our technical and scientific knowledge to the very problems which this Committee was established to solve.

In conclusion, I appeal again for an end to extraneous propaganda such as we have heard from representatives of the Soviet Union. What is the point in making

(Mr. Foster, United States)

tendentious charges about alleged United States aggressive policies while asserting the right to abet disturbances of the peace in the name of what have been called "wars of national liberation"? What is the point in calling for elimination of bases and withdrawal of foreign troops while insisting on the right to aid and supply elements threatening the security of other nations and at the same time obstructing United Nations peace-keeping activities?

Let us instead concentrate on the practical, the vital and constructive tasks that demand our attention. Let us work to halt the build-up and begin the reductions of stockpiles of the most deadly armaments. Let us undertake those tasks which are of benefit to the whole world and avoid those which would benefit only one group of States. In short, let us get on with the serious work for which we are assembled here.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): During my statement today I should like to make a few brief comments on the present stage of our debate, which is devoted to the problem of general disarmament. If we agree that this has been, still is and will remain the chief objective of the Committee, it is essential that the negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be given an appropriate place in the final report of this session.

I think it is unnecessary to recall that after four years of negotiations no progress has been made in this direction. It is obvious that if we had really entered into substantial negotiations on general and complete disarmament, on nuclear disarmament, many problems which now seem to us insoluble would have been solved in accordance with the interests of peace and of real security for all. We are not alone in taking this view: it is shared by many others.

But it is not in this direction that our efforts have been crowned with success. Indeed, the nuclear arms race has continued its threatening spiral, increasing still further the danger that hangs over the security and right to live of all peoples. Side by side with the negotiations of this Committee, the forces of aggression have created new centres of anxiety which endanger international peace in various regions of the world.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

The Romanian delegation wishes to protest once again against the continuation and intensification of United States aggression in Viet-Nam. In condemning the actions carried out by the United States against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, a free and sovereign State, we wish to express the solidarity of the Romanian people with the heroic Viet-Namese people who are struggling for the freedom and independence of their country, with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and with the National Liberation Front, the only legitimate representative of the people of South Viet-Nam.

For the sake of respect for the standards of international relations and for the peace and security of nations, it is essential that the bombing attacks against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam should cease, foreign troops be withdrawn from South Viet-Nam, and the provisions of the Geneva Agreements carried out. The Viet-Namese people alone have the right to decide the destiny and future of their country.

The intensification of negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty on general disarmament is also necessary in pursuance of a series of resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations which are far from execution. Recently, during the last session of the General Assembly, our Committee was again called upon "to continue its efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament . . ." (A/RES/2031(XX); ENDC/161). I am sure we all realize that the General Assembly will not remain content indefinitely with the lack of progress in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

The Romanian delegation considers that, whatever may be the scope, extent and urgency of the collateral measures which we consider from time to time within this Committee, there can be no justification for showing less interest in the problem of general and complete disarmament. In this respect we recall the statements made during the present session on the need never at any time to lose sight of our main objective, general disarmament, as the only measure capable under the present conditions of ensuring the peace and security of all peoples.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

As we have already had occasion to state, we consider that in order to approach this problem in a realistic manner we should start by giving priority to nuclear disarmament. A disarmament treaty which offered the possibility of eliminating from the very outset the danger of nuclear war would best correspond to the major interests of mankind. This includes the need to destroy, at the very first stage, all existing stocks of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, the elimination of military bases and the withdrawal of all armed forces stationed on the territory of other countries.

At the same time, the Romanian delegation has expressed itself in favour of the immediate banning of the use of nuclear weapons, which would be a first step towards the total destruction and the cessation of production of such weapons. It is our profound conviction --- and not only ours --- that so long as the idea of giving priority to nuclear disarmament is not really supported by all States, we cannot set out along the best path --- that of accomplishing disarmament.

Both in the present debates and at previous sessions of the Committee the Romanian delegation has repeatedly expressed itself in favour of radical measures --- required by the very nature of the nuclear danger --- which would lead to the elimination of this danger as quickly as possible. That is why we have supported the notion contained in the Soviet draft treaty on general disarmament concerning the destruction, beginning with the first stage, of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, as a measure leading to the elimination of the nuclear danger. At the same time we have stated that we are against the so-called percentage reduction proposed by the Western delegations, because, as has been observed, this measure would not only not reduce the nuclear danger but might even, under certain conditions, help to increase it.

During the present session of the Conference reference has been made to the possibility of using, within the framework of the negotiations, the method suggested by the Swedish delegation: that we begin discussion of the problem of general and complete disarmament not from stage I --- where the divergences are greatest --- but from stage III, where there is a certain similarity of ideas (ENDC/PV.202, pp.9 et seq.). The Romanian delegation sees no difficulty in trying this alternative, especially since, in the opinion of some, the relatively small amount of controversy over the content of the last stage could be used to widen the area where the parties might reach agreement.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

In the discussions on general disarmament one of the problems on which the positions very clearly diverge -- and today's meeting has given us yet further proof of this -- has been that of control over the implementation of disarmament measures. The different interpretations of the extent of control and of its role during the implementation of the disarmament process have constituted and still constitute one of the major obstacles holding up the negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

The Romanian delegation has already had occasion to express its opinion on this subject, but some further observations are necessary. We consider that the whole process of disarmament must be carried out under conditions of strict control, so as to guarantee that the disarmament measures which will be put into effect are respected by all States. It is essential that control over disarmament should not be transformed from a measure designed to help towards disarmament into an obstacle to its achievement.

Control proportionate to the extent, nature and scope of the disarmament measure to which it relates is necessary and can be carried out without endangering the security of States, if the standards of international law are respected. But to the extent to which the measure or control exceeded those limits it would obviously be transformed into a threat to the security of States and would thus constitute a serious obstacle to the implementation of the disarmament process.

During the four years which have elapsed since our Committee started its work, new objective elements have appeared which show that the problem of control can to a large extent be simplified. I am thinking first of the remarkable technical progress achieved in recent years, which places at the disposal of States, and particularly of the great Powers, definite means of acquiring data for verification within the framework of the disarmament process without recourse to measures of on-site inspection. I am thinking also of the fact that this technical progress has been accompanied by a lively movement of ideas, a stirring in various fields of science, the effect of which has been that some problems of control over disarmament which appeared to be insoluble now prove amenable to practical solution once they are tackled on a wide front.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

As other delegations have stressed, both in this Committee and during the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, we consider that any agreement on disarmament must reflect concern to ensure the security of all States and of each State in particular, and the need to establish a balance between the reciprocal obligations of the parties, at both the general and the regional levels.

The Romanian delegation is convinced that a disarmament agreement, or any partial measure directed to that goal, which laid down unilateral obligations for certain categories of States only -- which in the last analysis would mean total or partial deprivation of security for some, with all the ensuing consequences -- would not be in accordance with the lawful right of each nation to security in equal measure. Consequently any agreement must contain adequate obligations for all States, large or small, and thus provide guarantees for the peace and security of all nations.

Undoubtedly, it would not be realistic to believe that a disarmament treaty which imposed unequal obligations on different countries would be accepted by all States and could be implemented. All the experience of international life proves that the only durable international agreements are those based on respect for sovereignty, national independence, equality of rights, mutual advantage, and non-interference in internal affairs. That reality finds its place at all levels of the relations between States. As for disarmament, which so profoundly affects the fundamental interests of States, it is inconceivable that these basic principles of international life should not find their application there.

Mr. KHALLAF (United Arab Republic) (translation from French): Today I should like to deal with some aspects of underground nuclear weapon tests, a subject which retains its importance and urgency and to which we have been asked by the General Assembly to devote particular attention.

Indeed, one wonders how long world public opinion, which is vigorously opposed to all forms of nuclear weapon tests, can continue to tolerate this situation nearly three years after the signature of the treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear

(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

weapon tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1). Even the delegations at the twentieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations expressed their impatience and declared that it was difficult for them to understand the technical reasons or political considerations put forward from time to time to explain the delay in suspending underground nuclear weapon tests.

When the Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests was signed in Moscow in 1963, one wondered who would benefit from it: whether it would be in the interest of the United States or the Soviet Union. Apparently the answer was at that time, and still is, that the Treaty is in the interest of these two Powers and of all the countries of the world.

Furthermore, from that time onwards the question has arisen how long the Treaty would be respected by the signatory Powers. It must not be forgotten that at that time a sort of mistrust prevailed and it was feared that sooner or later the Treaty might cease to exist. Fortunately, however, confidence gradually overcame mistrust, and during the three years of its existence the Treaty has been respected by all the signatories. This is certainly a very favourable sign and should be regarded as an encouragement to take a further step towards the suspension of underground nuclear tests. This is all the more true since the 1963 Treaty did not preclude -- and does not even now -- all possibility of clandestine nuclear weapon tests in one or other of the three environments to which it applies.

Such clandestine tests, even if they have actually taken place, have not deprived the 1963 Treaty of its effectiveness or lessened its value. To be convinced of this it suffices to refer to the three following statements made in August 1963 before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate concerning the banning of nuclear tests. On tests in the atmosphere Mr. McNamara said -- I quote from page 106 of the original text:

(continued in English)

"Over the USSR and communist China only very low-yield tests with quite limited objectives could have a good chance of escaping discovery. These tests, we believe, could not produce significant advantages".

(continued in French)

On tests in outer space Mr. McNamara said, in reply to a question regarding the possibility of detecting Soviet explosions at a distance of 20,000 miles -- I quote from page 112 of the original text:

(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

(continued in English)

"I think the strong possibility is that we could detect it but I cannot guarantee we could do so. If we could not detect it I would feel certain it would not be so significant as to alter the military balance between our nations."

(continued in French)

Concerning underwater tests Mr. Seaborg said, in reply to a question whether an underwater test in Lake Baikal, in the Soviet Union, could be detected - I quote from page 241 of the original text:

(continued in English)

"We do not have the means of detecting such a test by instrumentation, by the methods of detecting nuclear tests through physical means."

(continued in French)

What I wanted to show is that the Moscow Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests was signed and applied although in the three environments to which it applies certain tests could be carried out which would escape detection. However, these tests were considered to be too insignificant to have any effect on the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. One wonders whether the same might apply to underground nuclear tests. We have been told that some of these tests cannot be detected or identified but that they also seem to be very small or of low magnitude; and it is added that scientific progress now makes it possible to overcome many difficulties in this field.

In this connexion I should like to quote the last three lines of the conclusions of the special report drawn up by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority on the detection and identification of underground explosions and kindly circulated by the United Kingdom delegation to the members of this Committee. They read as follows:

(continued in English)

"... therefore there is and always will be an uncertainty about the ability to detect and identify an individual low-magnitude event at a particular place and time".

(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

(continued in French)

In this regard I should also like to quote from the New York Herald Tribune of Friday 22 April 1966:

(continued in English)

"A British scientist has reported that seismic recordings from an American underground nuclear blast in the Aleutians last year were significantly different from natural geological disturbances in the area".

(continued in French)

If these difficulties persist none the less at the present time and it is impossible for this reason to conclude an agreement prohibiting any kind of underground nuclear test, nothing in that case would prevent us from making a beginning with tests which can be fully detected and identified by national seismological stations. This would, of course, be only a partial solution of the problem, but the limited Treaty of 1963 on the prohibition of nuclear tests has already created a precedent in this direction and there is no reason for not following it up with another partial measure, especially as this is the only solution.

Allow me to mention that such a solution or solutions have been sought for and advocated by various delegations in this Committee, including that of my country. Ambassador Hassan, the former Head of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, submitted on Tuesday 17 August 1965 three leading ideas in this regard, as follows:

First, the proposal --

"... for the extension of the Moscow Treaty to cover underground tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, which the admitted capacities and capabilities of the existing national equipments are able to detect and identify..." (ENDC/PV.224, pp. 9,10)

Secondly:

"As a complementary measure to the preceding one ... there should be a voluntary moratorium by nuclear Powers under which they would refrain from any further testing pending agreement on the decision needed for a comprehensive test-ban treaty". (ibid., p. 10).

Thirdly:

"... whatever the real obstacles may be, political or technical, we still believe as we have believed in the past that exchanging scientific and other information between the nuclear Powers, or continued improvement of detection and identification techniques, might help us to reach finally an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty". (ibid.)

This proposal had the good fortune to be received favourably by several delegations in this Committee; thus the United Kingdom representative said on 9 September 1965:

"Now I must admit that the proposal has some obvious attractions; and I can assure the Committee that my Government will give it full and detailed consideration." (ENDC/PV.231, p.12).

The representative of the Soviet Union also said on 7 September 1965:

"As the proposal of the United Arab Republic relates to the banning of a part of underground nuclear tests precisely under such conditions, and to the establishment of a moratorium on all other underground nuclear tests, the Soviet Union is prepared to meet the position of the United Arab Republic and to agree to the halting of underground nuclear weapon tests in that way". (ENDC/PV.230, p.9).

The representative of the Soviet Union had just said that the proposal by the Government of the United Arab Republic reflected "a realistic approach to a question which is ripe for solution" (ibid., p.9).

More particularly, and in respect of the idea of extending the Moscow Treaty to cover underground tests of a seismic magnitude of 4.75 and above, I should like to recall what has been said by other representatives in this Committee. Thus the representative of Ethiopia said on 23 February this year:

"We are happy to learn that modern technology has advanced to the point that it can identify underground explosions to the extent of a seismic magnitude of 4.75 and above. We anticipate, with hope, further acceleration of such studies..." (ENDC/PV.242, p.21).

In the same line of thought the representative of Mexico said on 8 March that the Committee should --

"... as we see it, examine the feasibility of extending the prohibitions of the Moscow Treaty to all underground tests which are known to lie beyond the present threshold of uncertainty and are therefore, beyond all risk of contradiction, fully detectable and identifiable by national seismological stations". (ENDC/PV.246, p.10).

(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

On the idea of a voluntary moratorium by the nuclear Powers, I should like to quote what was said by the representative of Ethiopia on 2 September 1965:

"The Ethiopian delegation supports the proposal made at our meeting of 17 August by the leader of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, that there should be a voluntary moratorium by the nuclear Powers under which they would refrain from any further testing pending agreement on the decision needed for a comprehensive test-ban treaty".
(ENDC/PV.229, p.16).

Lastly, on the exchange of scientific information proposed by Ambassador Hassan (ENDC/PV.224, p.10), I should like to stress that we have always expressed the opinion that the major nuclear Powers and all the States concerned should improve their techniques of detection and identification unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally by the exchange of scientific information and the promotion of scientific research.

In this connexion, let us note in the first place that the United States has constantly supported such an exchange. Thus on 2 September 1965 the representative of the United States said:

"We would welcome the ideas of any and all delegations about such problems as the detection and identification of earth tremors". (ENDC/PV.229, p.24).

In the same context I should like to quote what was said by the United Kingdom representative in his statement on 9 September 1965, in which he suggested that if the Soviet Union would be prepared to allow its scientists to take part with Western scientists in technical discussions, "perhaps we might yet find some common ground in the very valuable and constructive proposals put forward by the United Arab Republic". (ENDC/PV.231, p.13). On the other hand, on 15 February of this year the representative of India stated:

"India would like to see all countries agreeing to suspend all nuclear weapon tests. We can then consider what steps the international scientific community can take in mutual co-operation so that such suspension, and later a formal treaty, can be adequately observed". (ENDC/PV.240, p.9).

The ideas thus modestly put forward by our delegation are far from being the only ones in this field. Other delegations have submitted some very interesting suggestions. We shall mention only the important suggestions of the Swedish delegation concerning the detection club (ENDC/PV.247, pp.16 et seq.) and "verification by challenge" (ibid., p.23). In our opinion these two suggestions are in no way

(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

inconsistent with the ideas which Ambassador Hassan has already put forward and which I have just mentioned; on the contrary, these two kinds of proposals complement each other to some extent although there is not on that account any necessary link between them, nor are they interchangeable.

In this connexion, as we have already mentioned at the beginning of this statement, we have suggested the idea of a moratorium for certain underground nuclear tests, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement (ENDC/PV.224, p.10). This position of ours was based on the fact that we are a non-nuclear and non-aligned country which adheres to the principle of the immediate suspension of all nuclear tests and that we believe in the sincerity of the two major nuclear Powers when they declare that it is in their interest to close this path, still open, in the nuclear arms race.

Lastly, we rely on the degree of responsibility of the two great Powers to ensure that such a moratorium will be effectively respected pending a formal agreement.

It may be asked now whether the application of the moratorium can be associated with the concept of "verification by challenge" which has been eloquently explained by Mrs. Myrdal. Such association could, in our opinion, give to the application of the moratorium the following additional advantages:

First, "verification by challenge" would give the two sides the opportunity of applying it to a doubtful case before setting out to revoke the moratorium; this would have the effect of consolidating the moratorium itself.

Secondly, the explanations which the two Powers would have the opportunity to provide in these doubtful cases would contribute to a fruitful exchange of scientific information, which would tend to narrow the difference of views existing at the present time and would facilitate at a later stage the conclusion of a comprehensive and formal agreement on underground tests. In other words, the stage of the moratorium, which could thus be associated with "verification by challenge", would serve as a trial period for the two sides to enable them to arrive at the most appropriate system for detecting and identifying the underground tests covered by the moratorium.

Thus, in the light of the results of this trial, an agreement concerning the nuclear tests banned by the moratorium might no longer have any need of "verification by challenge". In the meantime the improvement of the techniques of detection and identification of underground events on a national basis, and the prospect of international co-operation in this field, are factors which can help to bring us nearer to the comprehensive agreement which is desired by all of us.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In connexion with the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, who put forward a whole series of objections to the position of the Soviet Union in the field of general and complete disarmament, we should like to say that we shall study his statement and in due course we shall give an appropriate reply to the considerations he advanced.

At the same time we consider it impossible to pass over in silence at present a number of arguments which the United States representative put forward. Thus he stated that the position of the Soviet Union in the field of control is such that it is preventing progress in the consideration of this question, that the Soviet Union objects to control, and that it agrees to its implementation only when some particular phase of disarmament has been completed.

We should like to point out that the position described as ours by the United States representative is a misrepresentation of our policy and position on questions of control. In this connexion I might quote our formula, which fully corresponds with the agreement that was reached in 1961 in regard to the Agreed Principles for Disarmament. Here is what we say on the question of control:

"The States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures" — I underline: all disarmament measures — "from beginning to end, under strict international control, and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty." (ENDC/2, p.3)

Thus the position of the Soviet Union is that we consider it essential that all measures from beginning to end should be carried out under strict international control.

On the other hand, the position of the United States in the field of control is indeed creating real obstacles to our progress in disarmament matters. Indeed, just imagine, the United States proposes at the first stage — I am taking this as an example — to reduce nuclear delivery vehicles by 30 per cent, subdividing this stage into specific phases providing for control to be carried out upon the completion of a specific phase — let us say, after nuclear weapon delivery vehicles have been reduced by 10 per cent; I repeat, 10 per cent. But in order to establish that the 10 per cent reduction had been carried out it would be necessary to inspect all armaments. And only after all armaments had been inspected would it be said whether or not the delivery vehicles had been reduced by 10 per cent.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Undoubtedly this position of the United States involves a direct threat to the security of countries that would accept such a proposal.

Indeed, where is the guarantee that the following would not happen: the United States inspects all our installations, all our nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and all our strategic delivery vehicles, and then it turns out that there will not be any disarmament? Thus, if we consider the position of the United States in the field of control in a strictly logical manner, we find this position to be that control must establish the state of armed forces; that is, it would be control over armaments. Whether or not there would be disarmament after that is, of course, a very big question. The whole system and all the proposals in the field of control undoubtedly involve a threat to the security of the countries that would agree to this proposal.

Moreover, this proposal is certainly contrary to the Agreed Principles. paragraph 5 of which reads:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, p.2)

Of course we cannot count on our security being ensured if all our armaments are inspected and afterwards it turns out that no disarmament will follow. Of course such a system of control, in the first place control over existing armaments, is unacceptable to us; it is contrary to the Agreed Principles, contrary to the object of not creating a threat to the security of any State. I merely wish to express here the idea that the United States has represented our position in such a way that we are made out to be against control and that we only agree to control taking place when the disarmament process has been completed. That, of course, entirely misrepresents and misinterprets our proposals and our position in regard to control.

Now I should like to say a few words on the remark made by the representative of the United States about the need to create the proper atmosphere for disarmament. I must tell you that we agree one hundred per cent that a favourable atmosphere must be created for disarmament and in particular for general and complete disarmament, otherwise it would be impossible. But we must say that it is precisely the United States that is preventing, by its actual deeds and policy, the creation of the

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

proper atmosphere and conditions which would enable us to consider these questions here in sufficiently favourable circumstances.

At one time it seemed to us that a more favourable situation was being created -- that was during the period when we concluded a number of agreements and, in particular, when an unwritten agreement was reached to reduce military budgets on the basis of mutual example. But when in the course of one year alone a vast budget of \$ 50 thousand million is raised by more than 25 per cent and attains the figure of \$ 65 thousand million, of course we cannot regard that as a favourable situation. It certainly causes difficulty in our work, not only in regard to the implementation of general and complete disarmament but also in regard to the implementation of individual disarmament measures.

How can we ignore this fact? Can we ignore the fact that a war is being waged in Viet-Nam, that the United States has started this war and is intensifying and expanding it all the time? The representative of the United States has levelled against us the reproach that we are indulging in propaganda in this regard, when we call the war carried on by the United States in Viet-Nam a war of aggression, and that we are thus creating an unnecessary atmosphere of tension in the Committee.

I must point out that we cannot disregard the war in Viet-Nam when we are considering any measure in the field of disarmament, whether it be a collateral measure or any problem relating to collateral measures, or whether it be general and complete disarmament. How can we disregard this question? If we consider the international situation as it really is, is that propaganda? If we want to be isolated by a kind of wall and not to see what is going on around us, I am bound to say that in such conditions we should be unable, of course, to make any progress in considering the problems which we are called upon to study here, and that we must be aware of the actual facts that are taking place.

In concluding these preliminary remarks, I should like to stress that the Soviet Union is making every effort to bring about the proper atmosphere for negotiations. If this proper atmosphere for negotiations on disarmament and for the work of the Committee does not exist, it is not the fault of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. We must say quite plainly and frankly that it is the fault, in the first place, of the United States, which has created the tension that has recently been steadily increasing on account of the events brought about by the United States in South-East Asia precisely as a result of the war which it started there.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Those are the preliminary remarks which we deemed it necessary to make in order to put the important question of general and complete disarmament, which we are considering today, in the right perspective.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I regret that what the Soviet representative has said about inspection simply confirms everything that I said in my statement. On many occasions we have put suggestions before this Conference on how to proceed with verification so that it would be used only to ensure that the national security of no participant was being threatened. We have suggested a good many methods of so doing, but we have never had a single constructive response to any of them, including the one submitted this morning. It is true that we want to start verification immediately when we begin to reduce -- presumably on a balanced basis -- the weapons on which we depend for security. There has never been any indication that the Soviet Union accepts the idea that the retained weapons have any impact on such security. I hope that the Soviet representative will look again at the many suggestions we have made for minimizing intrusion while maintaining the guarantees which a State must have in this difficult world if it is to reduce its weapons.

I think it is unnecessary for me to comment on the Soviet representative's remarks about the so-called United States aggression in Viet-Nam. The world knows perfectly well where the aggression comes from and the intention of the United States to counteract that aggression -- or any other aggression -- against a defenceless State. We have again and again stated our willingness to negotiate on any reasonable basis whatsoever to eliminate that aggression. But until there has been progress in that regard, the United States will continue to defend the true independence of the people of South Viet-Nam.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): As there are no further speakers on my list, I should like to address the Committee in my capacity as representative of Canada, in reply to the remarks of the representative of Poland at this meeting. We appreciated the fact that he replied to our arguments. We shall study what he has said and shall reply in due course if it seems that such a reply will be useful in furthering the deliberations of this Committee.

(The Chairman, Canada)

At this time, however, I feel that I should call to his attention and to the attention of the Committee that of all the attempts -- which he cited exhaustively -- to rule out by simple promises and simple treaties certain armaments and means of waging war, none has succeeded in preventing these armaments from being used. The Canadian delegation, like every other delegation, respects the desire of those who participated in those Conferences -- starting, I believe, in St. Petersburg in 1897 -- to make warfare more humane. If one studies the record, however, one cannot help but see that this approach -- the approach of writing treaties, making agreements and making verbal promises -- has not been successful.

Finally, the representative of Poland employed a figure of speech that we have heard here previously -- that is, the sword of Damocles hanging over the world. As he spoke, I wondered whether Damocles would have been perfectly content to sit there if he had simply been assured verbally -- or even with a piece of paper -- that the sword was not going to fall on his head. I think that he would have preferred to see the sword removed or at least supported by a chain.

That is all that I wish to say today on the statement of the representative of Poland, a statement which, I repeat, I appreciated.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 259th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador E.L.M. Burns, representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, Poland, the United States, Romania, the United Arab Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 28 April 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

